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INTRODUCTION
We find ourselves at a momentous turn in the history of vaccines. The COVID-19 
pandemic triggered a quasi-global vaccine race that not only compressed vaccine research and 
development (R&D) timelines, but also paved the way for the administration of a new type of 
vaccine technology – mRNA vaccines, which work in substantially different ways from the 
vaccines in use before the pandemic.1
While the process of bringing emerging COVID-19 vaccines to market has taken place in 
an unusually short timeframe,2 it was largely predicated on the same scientific and regulatory 
processes that govern the development, approval and deployment of new vaccines. For decades, 
these processes have encompassed several phases of vaccine testing – first without and 
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, Center for Health Law Studies. S.J.D., Duke Law 
School. I thank the organizers of the 2020 Lee E. Teitelbaum Utah Law Review Symposium on the law and ethics of 
medical for the invitation to participate and develop this writing project, as well as participants in the panel on 
clinical trials and legal and ethical issues in the age of COVID-19. I also thank Jesse Goldner for comments on early 
versions of the essay, and Kaena Kao and Hannah Schweissguth for research assistance.  
1 See e.g. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Understanding and Explaining mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/hcp/mrna-vaccine-basics.html (describing the new type of vaccine 
technology that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic). 
2 See e.g. Will Brothers, A Timeline of COVID-19 Vaccine Development, BIOSPACE (Dec. 3, 2020), 
https://www.biospace.com/article/a-timeline-of-covid-19-vaccine-development/ (providing an overview of the 
compressed timeline for the development of COVID-19 vaccine candidates). 
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subsequently with the involvement of human subjects3 – followed by an analysis of the emerging 
data.4
This Essay reflects on the evolution and status quo of the ways in which these data are 
gathered and disseminated within the context of the development of new vaccines. It treats 
information stemming from clinical trials as the initial building blocks of our vaccine data 
infrastructure, and surveys problems related to data collection and disclosure that have long been 
pervasive in the vaccine R&D ecosystem. 
Part I of the Essay situates the discussion of vaccine clinical trial data within historical 
boundaries. Part I.A travels back in time to the polio vaccine trials of the 1950s in the United 
States, which were one of the main catalysts of the adoption of the clinical trial structure now in 
place throughout the world. Part I.B then charts the formalization of the modern vaccine clinical 
trial model through legislation adopted between the polio and the COVID-19 vaccine races. 
Even though this formalization has resulted in a seemingly robust legal framework, there 
remain multiple problems that affect both the ways in which vaccine clinical trial data is actually 
generated and then utilized. Using examples from both past vaccine clinical trials and the COVID-
19 vaccine race, Part II.A focuses on data collection issues, with an emphasis on the under-
representation of minority populations in vaccine clinical trials. Part II.B then considers how 
imperfectly generated data meet further roadblocks in the form of delayed reporting or lack of 
reporting of clinical trial results, as well as restrictions to data sharing often attributable to agency 
interpretations of trade secrecy provisions that have long been disputed by several legal scholars.5
These problems affect both the transparency and accountability of vaccine innovation 
processes, and pose significant hurdles to follow-on R&D. Moreover, and relatedly, they can 
impair public trust on vaccine innovation processes at a time in which vaccine misinformation is 
quickly eroding overall levels of trust in vaccination as a public health tool.6 Part III concludes the 
3 See generally CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS
(2005). 
4 See e.g. HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1900–1990 (2000) (providing a historical overview of clinical trials in the United States throughout the 
twentieth century). 
5 See infra, notes 184-186 and accompanying text. 
6 See Alexande de Figueiredo et al., Mapping Global Trends in Vaccine Confidence and Investigating Barriers to 
Vaccine Uptake: A Large-Scale Retrospective Temporal Modelling Study, 396 LANCET 898 (2020), 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31558-0/fulltext 
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Essay by pointing towards emerging ways to enrich the existing vaccine clinical trial data 
infrastructure. Specifically, it provides a short case study on the COVID-19 data sharing policy 
implemented in the European Union by its counterpart to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
the European Medicines Agency. This ad hoc policy quickly expanded the disclosure of 
information about emerging COVID-19 drugs and vaccines in response to mounting pressure for 
more transparency about the drug and vaccine approval process. As such, it may be used as a 
blueprint by regulators elsewhere, as well as by proponents of a more robust system for the 
disclosure and sharing of clinical trial data. 
I. VACCINE CLINICAL TRIALS AND DATA INFRASTRUCTURE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. THE POLIO VACCINE AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CLINICAL TRIALS
April 26, 1954. Franklin Sherman Elementary School in McLean, Virginia.  
This date and place marked the beginning of the field trials7 for the polio vaccine candidate 
developed by Jonas Salk.8 This was a momentous occasion in the history of vaccinology. Called 
the largest experiment in public health to date, these trials encapsulated the evolution of vaccine 
research, development and testing.9
Poliomyelitis – a compound word bringing together the Greek for gray (polios) and marrow 
(myelos) with the Latin suffix used to denote inflammation (itis)10 – is a highly contagious 
infectious disease transmitted by the poliovirus.11 While 90% of people who contract the disease 
experience mild symptoms like fatigue or fever, or no symptoms at all, the virus causes paralysis 
7 Vaccine field trials are tests typically conducted in multiple sites across one or several countries in order to assess 
the performance of an experimental pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical product. See W. Charles Cockburn, Field 
Trials in the Evaluation of Vaccines, 47 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (1957). 
8 See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY (2006). 
9 Paul Meier, The Biggest Public Health Experiment Ever: The 1954 Field Trial of the Salk Poliomyelitis Vaccine, in 
STATISTICS: A GUIDE TO THE UNKNOWN (JUDITH M. TANUR ET AL., EDS) (1972), 
https://www.medicine.mcgill.ca/epidemiology/hanley/c622/salk_trial.pdf 
10 Oshinsky, supra note 8, at 9. 
11 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Poliomyelitis (Polio): Overview, https://www.who.int/health-
topics/poliomyelitis#tab=tab_1. 
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in the remaining 10% of the patient population.12 Affecting most commonly the legs,13 paralysis 
is permanent in most cases, and 5% to 10% of paralyzed patients die.14 The disease affects 
primarily children under the age of five,15 and before a vaccine was developed – and the disease 
incidence reduced by 99%16 –  polio outbreaks struck fear, especially among parents of young 
children.17
The 1950s brought about a series of scientific breakthroughs that eventually resulted in two 
foundational vaccines becoming available in the United States and then abroad.18 Building on 
recent work on the poliovirus,19 the research teams of Hilary Koprowski, Jonas Salk and Albert 
Sabin developed different types of polio vaccine candidates.20 Salk’s vaccine using a killed virus 
was the first one to be licensed,21 following the largest human trials for any medical product up to 
that point in history.22
12 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Poliomyelitis (Polio): Symptoms, https://www.who.int/health-
topics/poliomyelitis#tab=tab_2 
13 See e.g. Amy Berish, FDR and Polio, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum, 
https://www.fdrlibrary.org/polio https://www.fdrlibrary.org/polio (describing President Roosevelt’s lower limb 
paralysis after contracting polio at the relative late age of 39). 
14 WORLD HEALTH ORG., Poliomyelitis (Polio): Symptoms, supra note 12. 
15 WORLD HEALTH ORG., Poliomyelitis: Key Facts (2019), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/poliomyelitis 
16 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Does Polio Still Exist? Is It Curable? (2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-
detail/does-polio-still-exist-is-it-curable; THOMAS ABRAHAM, POLIO: THE ODYSSEY OF ERADICATION (2018); Anna 
N. Chard et al., Progress Toward Polio Eradication — Worldwide, January 2018–March 2020, MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (Jun. 26, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6925a4.htm; CTRS.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Polio Elimination in the United States (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/polio/what-
is-polio/polio-us.html  
17 See Volker Janssen, When Polio Triggered Fear and Panic Among Parents in the 1950s, History (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.history.com/news/polio-fear-post-wwii-era. See also PHILP ROTH, NEMESIS (2010) (portraying 
widespread parental fear during polio outbreaks in summertime). 
18 See generally Oshinsky, supra note 8 (describing the polio vaccine race). 
19 See Hans J. Eggers, Milestones in Early Poliomyelitis Research (1840 to 1949), 73 J. VIROL. 4533 (1999), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC112492/ (providing an overview of the research the enabled the 
development of polio vaccines in the 1950s); John F. Enders et al., Cultivation of the Lansing Strain of Poliomyelitis 
Virus in Cultures of Various Human Embryonic Tissues, 109 SCIENCE 85 (1949), 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/109/2822/85 (reporting the successful in vitro propagation of the poliovirus). 
20 Oshinsky, supra note 8. 
21 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Science and the Regulation of Biological Products (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/histories-product-regulation/science-and-regulation-biological-products 
22 See Meier, supra note 9. See also See Marcia Meldrum, “A Calculated Risk”: The Salk Polio Vaccine Field 
Trials of 1954, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 1233 (1998), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1114166/ 
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The 1954-55 trials of the Salk vaccine were sponsored by the National Foundation for 
Infantile Paralysis,23 now known as March of Dimes,24 and are generally regarded as marking the 
beginning of modern clinical trials.25 The trials focused on young children (first through third 
grade),26 and used a dual protocol, with both placebo and observed controls in place.27 Placebos 
are inert substances that do not produce a therapeutic effect.28 During the polio vaccine trials, 
623,972 children participated in the placebo-controlled trial, in which some received the vaccine 
candidate while others received a placebo.29 At the same time placebo-controlled trials were taking 
place, an even larger trial unfolded, in which over a million other children received the vaccine 
and no placebo was administered.30
The results of these combined trials were announced in 1955, showing that the Salk vaccine 
was 80% to 90% effective in generating protective immunity to polio.31 Broad administration of 
the Salk vaccine—and later on of other types of polio vaccines32—led to a drastic reduction in the 
number of polio cases in the United States and around the world.33 In 1979, polio was officially 
eliminated in the United States.34 No cases have originated domestically since then, and the 
23 Meldrum, ib.
24 MARCH OF DIMES, About Us, https://www.marchofdimes.org/# 
25 See e.g. Arnold S. Monto, Francis Field Trial of Inactivated Poliomyelitis Vaccine: Background and Lessons for 
Today, 21 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REVS. 7, 7 (1999) (listing the characteristics of the 1954-55 polio vaccine trials that 
place them “squarely at the start of the modern era” of clinical trials). 
26 Meldrum, supra note 22. 
27 Id, ib.
28 See Usha Gupta & Menka Verma, Placebo in Clinical Trials, 4 PERSPECT. CLIN. RES. 49 (2013), (describing the 
use of placebo in clinical trials in general); Annette Rid et al., Placebo Use in Vaccine Trials: Recommendations of a 
WHO Expert Panel, 32 VACCINE 4708 (2014), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24768580/ (addressing the 
specificities associated with the use of placebo in vaccine clinical trials). 
29 Meldrum, supra note 22, at 1233. 
30 Id, ib.
31Id, ib. 
32 See generally Lee Hampton, Albert Sabin and the Coalition to Eliminate Polio from the Americas, 99 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 34 (2009), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19008524/; Anda Baicus, History of Polio Vaccination, 1 
WORLD J. VIROL. 108 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3782271/  
33 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also Philip D. Minor, Polio Vaccines and the Cessation of 
Vaccination, 2 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 99 (2003), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12901601/; Ananda S. 
Bandyopadhyay et al., Polio Vaccination: Past, Present and Future, 10 FUTURE MICROBIOL. 791 (2015), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25824845/ 
34 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Polio Elimination in the United States (2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/polio/what-is-polio/polio-us.html 
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instances in which travelers have brought the virus to the United States have been few and far 
between, the last one occurring in 1993.35
In addition to generating the data necessary to support the licensure of the vaccine,36 the 
1954-55 polio vaccine trials also established the standard now in place for clinical trials involving 
both vaccines and other types of pharmaceutical products: randomized controlled trials.37 But 
while the polio trials in the United States provided the blueprint for what would become the global 
clinical trial standard, it took a major public health incident in the early 1960s for clinical trials to 
become mandatory for new drugs and vaccines entering the market.38
The hypnotic drug thalidomide, which was administered in several countries outside the 
United States in the late 1950s to pregnant women for several conditions, caused extensive birth 
defects in children.39 Working as a medical officer at the FDA, Dr. Frances Kelsey reviewed and 
rejected the application to market thalidomide in the United States due to insufficiencies in the 
information provided by the sponsor.40 While Dr. Kelsey’s intervention averted what would 
otherwise have almost certainly been an enormous public health crisis, the problems associated 
with review of thalidomide by regulatory agencies across the world called attention to the lacking 
legal framework governing the approval of new drugs and vaccines.41
Prior to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), there were no statutory 
requirements that drug sponsors submit data demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the products 
35 Id., ib.
36 See Rebekah H. Griesenauer & Michael S. Kinch, An Overview of FDA-Approved Vaccines & Their Innovators, 
16 EXPERT REV VACCINES. 1253 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6112117/. See also 
Science and the Regulation of Biological Products, supra note 21. 
37 Monto, supra note 25. See also Coleman et al., supra note 3; ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF 
CLINICAL RESEARCH (1988) (collectively providing an overview of the regulation of clinical research leading to, and 
including, clinical trials). 
38 See e.g. Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA Regulation, and the Amendment of America’s Drug 
Constitution, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 687 (2016); Joshua M. Sharfstein, Crises and Population Health, 96 Milbank 
Quarterly 223 (2018); Sharon B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical Examination of Food 
and Drug Legislation in the United States, 64 Food & Drug L. J. 599 (2009) (collectively describing how the 1961 
thalidomide crisis directly led to the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments in the United States).  
39 See e.g. Jack Botting, The History of Thalidomide, 15 DRUG NEW PERSPECT. 604 (2002), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12677202/ 
40 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Frances Oldham Kelsey: Medical Reviewer Famous for Averting a Public Health 
Tragedy, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/virtual-exhibits-fda-history/frances-oldham-kelsey-medical-reviewer-
famous-averting-public-health-tragedy 
41 Supra note 38. 
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they intended to bring to market.42 The 1938 Act established the principle that safety data must be 
submitted to the FDA before a new drug or vaccine comes to market by requiring that sponsors 
conduct “adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not the drug is 
safe.”43 In 1962, in direct response to the thalidomide crisis, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments to the FDCA, which introduced the requirement that sponsors of new drugs and 
vaccines demonstrate that their product is “efficacious” before becoming to market.44 Sponsors 
were thus require to produce “substantial evidence” of the effectiveness of a drug or vaccine by 
presenting data generated through “adequate and well-controlled studies.”45
While the new law made clinical trials a pre-requisite of market entrance, it did not define 
the concepts of “adequate” or “well-controlled” studies, nor did FDA guidance provide much more 
information to sponsors immediately after the Kefauver-Harris Amendments were enacted.46 The 
legal framework that would make clinical trials the sine qua non of drug and vaccine approval was 
nonetheless in place, and it was incrementally strengthened through legislative and regulatory 
interventions in the following decades.47
The clinical trial paradigm applied on a large scale during the 1954-55 polio vaccine trials 
and codified in 1962 in the United States quickly became part of the regulatory frameworks in 
other countries.48 Randomized controlled trials became known as the “gold standard” in drug and 
42 See e.g. Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, at 5, 
https://www.fda.gov/media/110437/download 
43 Junod, id., ib.
44 Id., at 8-12 (also noting other measures introduced to strengthen the role of the FDA in drug review). See also 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, (2012), 
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/kefauver-harris-amendments-revolutionized-drug-development.  
45 See Junod, id., at 11-12. 
46 Junod at 12. 
47 Id., ib. See also e.g. Clinical Trial Regulations of 1970; Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 
1997, infra note 74 and accompanying text; Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, infra note 76 
and accompanying text; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Clinical Trials Guidance Documents (2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/clinical-trials-guidance-documents 
48 See e.g. Gail A.Van Norman, Drugs and Devices: Comparison of European and U.S. Approval Processes, 1 
JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 399 (2016), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2452302X16300638 (noting similar substantive drug review 
procedures and standards in the United States and countries in the European Union in spite of organizational 
differences between the FDA and the European Medicines Agency). 
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vaccine effectiveness research and have remained a core component of the scientific and drug 
review processes ever since.49
B. FROM POLIO TO COVID-19 AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW VACCINE TECHNOLOGY
March 16, 2020. Kaiser Permanente Washington Research Institute in Seattle. 
This date and place marked the beginning of the clinical trials for the first COVID-19 
vaccine candidate. Less than nine months later, the FDA authorized the emergency use of the first 
COVID-19 vaccines ever developed.50
Several parallels have been drawn between the COVID-19 and the polio vaccine races, 
even though more than six decades separate these events.51 In both cases, an infectious pathogen 
not fully understood by the scientific community triggered a major public health crisis, spread fear 
among the populations most vulnerable to the disease and their families, and prompted a vaccine 
race amidst multiple competitors in different countries, resulting in the development, 
manufacturing and distribution of groundbreaking vaccines within extremely compressed 
timelines.52
By the time the COVID-19 trials began, however, the legal framework regulating clinical 
trials had evolved considerably, both to reflect evolving scientific notions and to strengthen the 
protection of clinical trial volunteers. 
49 Supra note 37 and accompanying text. See also e.g. Elliott M. Antman & Barbara E. Bierer, Standards for 
Clinical Research: Keeping Pace with the Technology of the Future, 133 CIRCULATION 823 (2016), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4778966/ 
50 See 21 U.SC. § 360bbb-3; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Emergency Use Authorization of Medical Products and 
Related Authorities—Guidance for Industry and Other Stakeholders (2017), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-
information/search-fda-guidance-documents/emergency-use-authorization-medical-products-and-related-authorities 
51 See e.g. David Oshinsky, What the Polio Vaccine Can Teach Us About the Covid-19 Vaccine, CNN (Nov. 17, 
2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/17/opinions/covid-polio-vaccine-parallels-oshinsky/index.html; Arthur Allen, 
Trust, Fear and Solidarity Will Determine the Success of a COVID Vaccine, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 17, 
2020), https://khn.org/news/trust-fear-and-solidarity-will-determine-the-success-of-a-covid-vaccine/ 
52 See e.g. Ewen Callaway, The Race for Coronavirus Vaccines: A Graphical Guide, Nature (Apr. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01221-y (chronicling the early stages of the COVID-19 vaccine race); 
Gilbert King, Salk, Sabin and the Race Against Polio, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 3, 2012), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/salk-sabin-and-the-race-against-polio-169813703/ (chronicling the polio 
vaccine race). 
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While the polio vaccine trials are still hailed by many commentators as a great achievement 
in medical research,53 they were also conducted partly in ways that would constitute a violation of 
modern ethical principles governing biomedical research, such as the testing of the vaccine on 
institutionalized physically and intellectually disabled children during the early stages of 
research.54
There were cases of even more extensive ethical violations in medical research even as 
clinical trials became progressively more regulated, both in the context of vaccine research and in 
other areas. The most well-known example is the Tuskegee Study, a forty-year federally funded 
medical research program (1932-1972) conducted with the purpose of observing the evolution of 
untreated syphilis in black male populations, during the course of which several egregious ethical 
violations were repeatedly committed.55 These violations included deceptive statements about the 
purpose of the study made by researchers to economically disadvantaged volunteers,56 as well as 
the intentional deprivation of available treatments to syphilis patients, which produced detrimental 
effects to both the health of the individuals involved in the study and that of their families and 
communities.57 The repercussions of the Tuskegee Study are felt to this day, with lower levels of 
trust in medical research registered among minority communities being partially connected to the 
memory and impact of Tuskegee.58 A study published in 2018 – forty-six years after the end of 
Tuskegee – found that, in addition to giving rise to medical mistrust issues, the Tuskegee Study 
53 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
54 History of Vaccines, Polio Brochure 1 (1952), https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/salk-begins-early-polio-
vaccine-tests-0. For further discussion of ethical aspects of the Salk vaccine development and testing, see also Allan 
M. Brandt, Polio, Politics, Publicity, and Duplicity: Ethical Aspects in the Development of the Salk Vaccine, 8 INT’L 
J. HEALTH SERVICES 257 (1979), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/717614 
55 See Ruqaiijah Yearby, Exploitation in Medical Research: The Enduring Legacy of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 67 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1171 (2017). 
56 Id. at 1172. 
57 Id. at 1172-73. 
58 Id. See also Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 21 (1978); et al., Knowledge of the Tuskegee Study and Its Impact on the Willingness to Participate in Medical 
Research Studies, 92 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N. 563 (2000). See also generally HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL 
APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 
THE PRESENT (2006) (detailing the history of the exploitation of Black American populations in medical research 
before and after Tuskegee). 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3760919
Early draft. Forthcoming in Utah Law Review. Please direct comments to ana.rutschman@slu.edu 
10
“correlated with increases in (…) mortality and decreases in both outpatient and inpatient 
physician interactions for older black men.”59
In the case of vaccine-related research, one of the most prominent examples is the so-called 
“experiment” at Willowbrook State School in Staten Island.60 Researchers interested in 
understanding more about hepatitis C with the eventual goal of developing a vaccine conducted a 
non-therapeutic study for roughly fifteen years (1955/56–1971)61 on developmentally disabled 
children by deliberately infecting them with the virus and monitoring their progress.62
A Forbes journalist interviewed the mother of one of these children over fifty years after 
the Willowbrook study began, and aptly characterized some of the ways in which parental consent 
was obtained as a “Faustian bargain:”  
In order to get [her severely autistic daughter] a spot at the 
overcrowded facility, however, she had to make a Faustian 
bargain—consenting to allow her daughter to be part of a quest to 
find a vaccine for hepatitis. “I had no choice,” McCourt says, “I had 
tried so many different places and so many arrangements, and they 
didn't work out, so I went along with it.”63
59 Marcella Alsan & Marianne Wanamaker, Tuskegee and the Health of Black Men, 133 Q. J. ECON 407 (2018), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30505005/ 
60 See Stephen Goldby, Experiments at the Willowbrook State School, 297 LANCET 749 (1971), 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(71)92009-5/fulltext. But see Saul Krugman, The 
Willowbrook Hepatitis Studies Revisited: Ethical Aspects, 8 REV. INFECTIOUS DIS. 157 (1986), 
https://academic.oup.com/cid/article-abstract/8/1/157/350487?redirectedFrom=fulltext (offering a defense of the 
study design by the lead researcher in the Willowbrook study). 
61 There are disparities in the reporting of the starting date for the Willowbrook study. See e.g. Willowbrook 
Hepatitis Experiments in NAT’L INST. HEALTH, EXPLORING BIOETHICS, (2009), 
https://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/webversions/bioethics/guide/pdf/master_5-4.pdf (providing a 1955 
starting date); James M. DuBois, Hepatitis Studies at the Willowbrook State School for Children with Mental 
Retardation, ETHICS IN MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH, 
https://sites.google.com/a/narrativebioethics.com/emhr/contact/hepatitis-studies-at-the-willowbrook-state-school-
for-children-with-mental-retardation (providing a 1956 starting date). 
62 Trials in which healthy participants are infected with a pathogen are also known as challenge studies. See e.g. 
Annette Rid & Meta Roestenberg, Judging the Social Value of Controlled Human Infection Studies, 34 BIOETHICS
749 (2020). The topic of challenge studies has also been discussed in the context of the COVID-19 vaccine race. See 
e.g. Jeffrey P. Kahn et al., For Now, It’s Unethical to Use Human Challenge Studies for Sars-Cov-2 Vaccine 
Development, 117 PNAS 28538 (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.pnas.org/content/117/46/28538 (arguing against the 
use of challenge studies in the COVID-19 vaccine race); Seán O’Neill McPartlin  et al., Covid-19 Vaccines: Should 
We Allow Human Challenge Studies to Infect Healthy Volunteers With Sars-Cov-2? 371 BRIT. MED. J. m4258 
(2020) (exploring arguments both in favor and against challenge studies for COVID-19 vaccines). 
63 Leah Rosenbaum, The Hideous Truths of Testing Vaccines on Humans, FORBES (Jun. 12, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leahrosenbaum/2020/06/12/willowbrook-scandal-hepatitis-experiments-hideous-
truths-of-testing-vaccines-on-humans/?sh=10e391a4279c. See also Coleman et al., supra note 3, at 40 (further 
describing the Willowbrook study). 
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In response to systemic ethical failures long observed in medical research, and in particular 
as a direct response to the publicization of the Tuskegee Study, a code of conduct known as the 
Belmont Report was published in the United States in 1979, providing a set of ethical principles 
and guidelines designed to protect participants in clinical research.64
The subsequent decades brought about significant changes in the legal protections offered 
to participants in biomedical research. Some of these changes were directly aimed at protecting 
volunteers participating in clinical trials, as is the case of laws regulating informed consent, while 
others protected volunteers indirectly by focusing on the collection of data during trials and 
ensuing permissible uses. 
In 1981, the principles enshrined in the Belmont Report became the foundation of the legal 
framework governing federal protection of human subjects involved in clinical research, primarily 
through the regulation of informed consent.65 In 1991, they were codified in the Common Rule,66
which was revised in 2018.67
In an attempt to correct asymmetries in data collection, particularly with regard to the 
representation of women and racial and ethnic minorities, the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 was 
introduced to mandate appropriate inclusion of minority volunteers in research funded by the 
National Institutes of Health.68 As noted in Part II in the context of COVID-19 vaccine trials, 
64 Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Report of 
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 23,192, 23,194 (Apr. 18, 1979) (establishing the ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence and 
justice, and requiring three elements in connection with informed consent: information, comprehension and 
voluntariness). See also Eli Y Adashi et al., The Belmont Report at 40: Reckoning with Time, 108 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1345 (2018), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30138058/ (surveying the application of the Belmont report 
and emerging issues not contemplated by the drafters of the Report). 
65 General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005). 
66 See 45 C.F.R. § 46 and 21 C.F.R. § 50 (collectively laying out the regulatory regime for the protection of human 
subjects in clinical trials, the former in the context of federally funded research, and the latter in the context of 
clinical trials overseen by the FDA). 
67 DPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, Revised Common Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-
policy/regulations/finalized-revisions-common-rule/index.html. See also Jerry Menikoff et al., The Common Rule, 
Updated, 376 N. ENGL. J. MED. 613 (2017), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28103146/; Valerie Gutmann Koch & 
Kelly Todd, Research Revolution or Status Quo?: The New Common Rule and Research Arising From Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 81 (2018). 
68 NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, Public Law 103-43. But see Stacie E. Geller et al., The More Things Change, the 
More They Stay the Same: A Study to Evaluate Compliance with Inclusion and Assessment of Women and Minorities 
in Randomized Controlled Trials, 93 ACAD. MED. 630 (2018), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29053489/ (finding 
that “NIH policies have not resulted in significant increases in reporting results by sex, race, or ethnicity”).  
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problems of under-representation of racial and ethnic minorities persist in spite of these legislative 
efforts. 
As also described in the following section, another strand of long-standing problems affects 
the collection and dissemination of clinical trial data. On the one hand, not all clinical trials are 
registered, a phenomenon that poses significant hurdles to research transparency and 
accountability, as well as to access to existing data for purposes of follow-on innovation.69 On the 
other hand, even in the case of registered trials with published results, current industry practices 
result in the availability of severely incomplete data, which similarly impairs transparency, 
accountability and follow-on research.70
The Declaration of Helsinki, originally adopted in 1964 and last amended in 2013, 
established that clinical trials must be registered in publicly available databases,71 and imposed a 
duty of dissemination of clinical trial results on medical researchers.72 The United States codified 
clinical trial reporting requirements consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki,73 and in 1997 the 
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) required the registration of clinical 
trials for serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions.74 Three years later, the National 
Institutes of Health launched a national registry of clinical trials hosted by the U.S. National 
Library of Medicine, Clinicaltrials.gov.75 Registration requirements for clinical trials were scaled 
up in 2007 by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA),76 which required 
the government to expand the federal clinical trial data bank.77 However, as further detailed in Part 
69 Infra, Part II.B. 
70 Ib.
71 World Med. Ass’n Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 
[hereinafter Declaration of Helsinki] 35, https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-
principles-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/ 
72 Id., 36. 
73 See Final Rule for Clinical Trials Registration and Results Information Submission (42 CFR § 11); Food and 
Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA 801) § 801. 
74 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997). See also 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Regulations: Good Clinical Practice and Clinical Trials (2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/science-research/clinical-trials-and-human-subject-protection/regulations-good-clinical-
practice-and-clinical-trials 
75 CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov 
76 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–85, 121 Stat. 823. 
77 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(2)(A)(i). 
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II, registration of clinical trials remains far from uniform,78 and there has been very little 
institutional support within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for the 
enforcement of the trial registration requirements set by FDAMA and FDAAA. In 2016, six years 
after the statutory deadline,79 the Department of Health and Human Services issued a final rule 
implementing the reporting requirements set forth in FDAAA.80 The rule, which entered into force 
in January of the following year, exempted clinical trials completed81 before January 18, 2017 
from data reporting requirements in cases in which the sponsored product had not been approved 
by the FDA at the date of completion of the trial.82 In 2020, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York found that the FDAAA unambiguously required sponsors to submit data and 
HHS to include it in ClinicalTrials.gov irrespective of trial completion date or product approval, 
thus striking down the reporting exemption.83
Contemporary vaccine clinical trials thus take place against a legal and normative 
background that is vastly different from the ones in which the polio vaccine trials were conducted 
– albeit one in which profound shortcomings persist at the representativity, registration, data 
reporting and data sharing levels, as illustrated by the vaccine-specific examples provided in the 
following section.84
Recently, the introduction of new and disruptive vaccine technology has ratcheted up the 
challenges posed to the clinical trial ecosystem and the data infrastructure it generates. After over 
a decade of study, the COVID-19 vaccine race provided the final catalyst for late-stage 
development of a novel type of vaccine: mRNA vaccines.85 Messenger RNA is a type of genetic 
78 Infra, Part II.B. 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(D)(i). See also Complaint, Seife v. US Department of Health & Human Services, 18-cv-
11462 (2018), at 11, https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/crit/document/01_complaint.pdf 
80 81 Fed. Reg. 64,981 (Sept. 21, 2016), Clinical Trials Registration and Results Information Submission, codified at 
42 C.F.R. § 11. 
81 The rule applies to “primary completion” of clinical trials. See 42 C.F.R. § 11.42(b), which is interpreted as 
meaning the date of completion, defined as “date that the final subject was examined or received an intervention for 
the purposes of final collection of data for the primary outcome, whether the clinical trial concluded according to the 
pre-specified protocol or was terminated.” See 42 C.F.R. § 11.10 (a). 
82 42 C.F.R. § 11.42(b) (exempting trials completed before January 18, 2017). 
83 Seife v. US Department of Health & Human Services, WL 883478 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020). 
84 See infra Part II.A (surveying representativity issues) and Part II.B. (surveying registration, data reporting and 
data sharing issues). 
85 See e.g. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 1. 
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material that contains instructions for the human body to create certain types of proteins.86 In the 
case of mRNA vaccines, scientists use a synthetic version of mRNA to direct the human body to 
produce some of the same proteins that the virus normally produces, without actually ever 
introducing viral matter into the body.87 In response to the presence of these proteins, the immune 
system triggers a protective response.88 By contrast, vaccines available before the pandemic had 
to rely on small amounts of viral matter as a way to trigger the same type of response.89
The COVID-19 mRNA vaccine candidates were developed in a matter of months – faster 
than COVID-19 vaccines based on older technology – followed by a short period of clinical trials 
thus testing a medical technology never before used in humans.90 Regulators across the world were 
called to evaluate data generated under these extreme circumstances and decide whether to 
authorize the emergency use of vaccines before enough data was gathered for sponsors to request 
a full approval of their vaccine candidates.91 As a trade-off for making critical public health tools 
available to large segments of the population, these regulators – including the FDA – eventually 
granted emergency use authorizations to the leading COVID-19 vaccine candidates by relying on 
data inherently far more limited than the data normally supplied in support of applications to 
market new vaccines.92
86 U.S. NAT’L HUM. GENOME RESEARCH INST., Messenger RNA (mRNA), https://www.genome.gov/genetics-
glossary/messenger-rna 
87 See generally Jennifer Abbasi, COVID-19 and mRNA Vaccines—First Large Test for a New Approach, 324 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N. 1125 (2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2770485. Carlo Iavarone et al., 
Mechanism of Action of mRNA-based Vaccines, 16 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 871 (2017), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28701102/. See also MODERNA, The Science and Fundamentals of mRNA 
Technology, https://www.modernatx.com/mrna-technology/science-and-fundamentals-mrna-technology (including a 
description of mRNA vaccine technology provided by one of the sponsors mRNA COVID-19 vaccines authorized in 
the United States in late 2020). 
88 See Understanding and Explaining mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines, supra note 85. 
89 Id., ib.
90 See A Timeline of COVID-19 Vaccine Development, supra note 2. 
91 See EUR. MED. AGENCY, EMA Recommends First COVID-19 Vaccine for Authorisation in the EU (Dec. 21, 
2020), https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/news/ema-recommends-first-covid-19-vaccine-authorisation-eu; HEALTH 
CANADA, Statement on the U.S. Authorization of the Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 18, 2020), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/news/2020/12/statement-on-the-us-authorization-of-the-moderna-covid-19-
vaccine.html; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19 by Issuing 
Emergency Use Authorization for First COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-
covid-19 
92 See FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID, ib. 
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The Essay has so far provided contextual information on the emergence of the 
contemporary vaccine clinical trial model, noting longstanding issues in the ways vaccine-related 
knowledge is produced in clinical trials and resulting data are disclosed, now combined with 
challenges to regulatory review of new vaccines when vaccine data are generated in timelines 
severely compressed by public health crises. Part II now focuses on systemic issues affecting the 
production and disclosure of vaccine clinical trial data.  
II. VACCINE CLINICAL TRIAL DATA AS BUILDING BLOCKS
A. DATA COLLECTION: LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT VACCINE CLINICAL TRIAL 
DATA INFRASTRUCTURE
Data generated during vaccine clinical trials is the bedrock of the scientific and regulatory 
processes that bring new vaccines to market.93 Yet, the ways in which those data are produced 
have long resulted in a data infrastructure marked by gaps in foundational knowledge related to 
the development and testing of new vaccines.94 This, in turn, has an impact on the intrinsic 
completeness, accuracy and transparency of vaccine data collection – and by extension on 
instrumental uses of those data, such as the use of clinical trial data to support the approval (or 
denial) of a new vaccine,  – as well as on public perceptions of how vaccines are developed, tested 
and made available to populations at large.95
One of the most salient holes in the vaccine data infrastructure stems from the under-
representation of certain segments of the population in vaccine clinical trials – most notably, 
minority populations.96 Even though legislation has been introduced to address representativity 
93 See e.g. Cynthia Ho, Avoiding the TRIPS Trap: A Path to Domestic Disclosure of Clinical Drug Data Consistent 
with International Norms __ CORNELL INT’L L. J. __ at 15-18 (forthcoming, 2021) (on file with author) (linking the 
availability of clinical trial data to transparency); Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in 
International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
1, 51, 54-58 (2009) (making the case that treating clinical trial data as a public good would result in long-term 
follow-on innovation). 
94 See supra, Part II. 
95 Ib.
96 There are additional categories of populations under-represented in vaccine clinical trials. Consider the case of 
pediatric populations during the COVID-19: clinical trials for coronavirus vaccines did not enroll children until late 
2020. See e.g. Jeffrey I. Campbell et al., A Call for Pediatric COVID-19 Clinical Trials, 146 PEDIATRICS e20201081 
(2020), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/146/2/e20201081; Denise Grady, Moderna Plans to Begin 
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problems in clinical trials,97 minorities have long been underrepresented in clinical trials, both in 
the United States98 and elsewhere.99 The landscape in vaccine clinical trials reflects this systemic 
problem. For instance, an online registry made available early in the pandemic by the COVID-19 
Prevention Network to enable individuals to express interest in participating in COVID-19 vaccine 
clinical trials had enlisted around 350,000 people by late August 2020, of which only around 10% 
were Black or Hispanic.100
COVID-19 clinical trials further illustrated systemic problems affecting the participation 
of racial and ethnical minorities. Researchers have found both problems of minority under-
representation in clinical trial design and a lack of uniformity across trial sites in the collection and 
reporting of data on race and ethnicity.101 Consider the cases of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine 
candidate, which in December 2020 became the first vaccine authorized by the FDA for emergency 
use,102 and of the Moderna vaccine candidate, which was the first to enter clinical trials.103
Phase 3 of the clinical trial that produced the data used to support the emergency use 
authorization granted to Pfizer/BioNTech was initially designed with target of 30,000 patients and 
Testing Its Coronavirus Vaccine in Children, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/health/Covid-Moderna-vaccine-children.html 
97 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
98 See Paula A. Rochon et al., The Inclusion of Minority Groups in Clinical Trials: Problems of Under 
Representation and Under Reporting of Data, 11 ACOUNT RES. 215 (2004); Barbara A. Noah, The Participation of 
Underrepresented Minorities in Clinical Research, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 221 (2003); Jill A. Fisher & Corey A. 
Kalbaugh, Challenging Assumptions About Minority Participation in US Clinical Research, 101 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2217 (2011); Ali Salman et al., A Review of Barriers to Minorities’ Participation in Cancer Clinical Trials: 
Implications for Future Cancer Research, 18 J. IMM. MINOR. HEALTH 447 (2016); Andrea L. Gilmore-Bykovskyi et 
al., Recruitment and Retention of Underrepresented Populations in Alzheimer’s Disease Research: A Systematic 
Review, 5 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA: TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH & CLINICAL INTERVENTIONS 751 (2019); Bassel 
Nazha et al., Enrollment of Racial Minorities in Clinical Trials: Old Problem Assumes New Urgency in the Age of 
Immunotherapy, 39 AM. SOC’Y CLINICAL ONCOLOGY EDUC. 3(2019). 
99 See e.g. Mahvash Hussain-Gambles et al., Why Ethnic Minority Groups Are Under-Represented in Clinical 
Trials: A Review of the Literature, 12 HEALTH SOC. CARE COMMUNITY 382 (2004), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15373816/ (discussing minority under-representation in the United Kingdom); 
100 Carolyn Y. Johnson, Large U.S. Covid-19 Vaccine Trials Are Halfway Enrolled, But Lag on Participant 
Diversity, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/08/27/large-us-covid-19-
vaccine-trials-are-halfway-enrolled-lag-participant-diversity/ 
101 Hala T. Borno et al., Covid-19 Disparities: An Urgent Call for Race Reporting and Representation in Clinical 
Research, Contemp Clin Trials Commun. (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7391979/ 
(surveying clinical trials focusing on products other than vaccines). 
102 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine Letter, 
https://www.fda.gov/media/144412/download 
103 MODERNA, Moderna Announces First Participant Dosed in NIH-led Phase 1 Study of mRNA Vaccine (mRNA-
1273) Against Novel Coronavirus (Mar. 16, 2020), https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-
details/moderna-announces-first-participant-dosed-nih-led-phase-1-study 
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later expanded.104 On December 14, 2020, Pfizer reported a total enrollment of 44,863 volunteers 
in 150 sites across six countries, including the United States.105 By then, 43,004 volunteers (95.9% 
of the trial population) had received the second shot.106 At that point, demographic data relative to 
the United States indicated that 13% of volunteers were Latinx, 10% were Black, 6% were Asian 
and 1.3% were Native American.107 Although, Pfizer’s announcement did not specify this 
information at the time, these numbers imply that 69.7% of the volunteers in the Pfizer/BioNTech 
vaccine trial in the United States did not belong to racial or ethnic minorities, for an overall 
diversity rate of 30.3%.108
Moderna’s vaccine clinical trial, which took place across sites in over twenty states in the 
United States,109 drew from a somewhat smaller volunteer pool (30,000 participants) and displayed 
a slightly higher diversity rate. Just over a month before submitting its emergency use authorization 
application to the FDA, Moderna released a report on phase 3 trials for its vaccine candidate, which 
at that point had met its enrollment goal of 30,000 volunteers in several sites across the United 
States.110 By October 22, 2020, a total of 25,654 participants had received the second dose of the 
vaccine.111 Demographic data showed that 20% of volunteers were Latinx, 10% were Black or 
African American, 4% were Asian, 63% were White, and all other races and ethnicities accounted 
for 3% of the trial population.112 These numbers put the diversity rate almost 7 points above 
Pfizer/BioNTech’s, at 37%. 
Yet neither Moderna nor Pfizer/BioNTech’s diversity targets and near-final diversity 
enrollment are satisfactory according to experts. In August 2020, Moderna used social media to 
promote its “diversity & inclusion” plan for COVID-19 trials, noting that their vaccine candidate 
104 See Matthew Herper, Pfizer and BioNtech Announce Plan to Expand Covid-19 Vaccine Trial, STAT (Sept. 12, 
2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/09/12/pfizer-and-biontech-announce-plan-to-expand-covid-19-vaccine-trial/ 




108 Id., ib. (listing diversity rates for participants in the Pfizer/BioNTech clinical trial). 
109 MODERNA, Moderna Cove Study, at 2 https://www.modernatx.com/sites/default/files/content_documents/2020-
COVE-Study-Enrollment-Completion-10.22.20.pdf (reporting data relative to October 21, 2020), at 6. 
110 MODERNA, Moderna’s Fully Enrolled Phase 3 COVE Study of mRNA-1273, https://www.modernatx.com/cove-
study 
111 Id., ib.
112 MODERNA, Moderna Cove Study, at 2 https://www.modernatx.com/sites/default/files/content_documents/2020-
COVE-Study-Enrollment-Completion-10.22.20.pdf (reporting data relative to October 21, 2020). 
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was being tested in “nearly 100 sites with representative demography.”113 Shortly thereafter, 
however, the company had to slow down the enrollment process because it was not able to recruit 
enough participants from racial and ethnic minorities.114 Facing similar problems, Pfizer expanded 
its target enrollment from 30,000 to 40,000 volunteers.115 Pfizer’s press release specifically noted 
that the expansion was driven by the goal to “increase trial population diversity.”116 In the context 
of this specific trial, diversity efforts were also focused on including younger populations in order 
to garner data on volunteers as young as age 16, as well as populations with certain conditions, 
such as chronic HIV and  Hepatitis C.117
The examples of Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna within the context of the COVID-19 
vaccine race are especially relevant given the fact that their vaccine candidates were the first to 
enter the United States market, but these companies are by no means the only ones facing diversity 
problems in vaccine clinical trials. A representative for Velocity Clinical Research, an organization 
involved in COVID-19 vaccine trials in multiple locations across the United States,118 reported 
similar enrollment problems, describing instructions to slow down volunteer recruitment in a way 
that tersely illustrates the magnitude of the problem: “Some of our sites, bluntly, are situated in a 
largely white population [sic]. We have had sites in those places that were told, ‘You need to stop 
now and only recruit from minorities.’”119
Moderna’s data on the progression of clinical trial enrollment is similarly illustrative: 
113 TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2020), https://twitter.com/moderna_tx/status/1296942996592746498 
114 Eric Broodman, Among People of Color Asked to Join Covid-19 Vaccine Trials, Worries About Inequities Run 
Deep, STAT (Sept. 25), https://www.statnews.com/2020/09/25/among-people-of-color-asked-to-join-covid-19-
vaccine-trials-worries-about-inequities-run-deep/ 
115 Id., ib.




118 VELOCITY CLINICAL RESEARCH, https://velocityclinical.com 
119 Broodman, Among People of Color Asked to Join Covid-19 Vaccine Trials, Worries About Inequities Run Deep, 
supra note 114. 
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Figure 1: Moderna COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials enrollment, July 27, 2020 through October 21, 2020 120
The graph shows that during the first half of the enrollment period, White participants were 
being recruited at rates that more than doubled those of non-White participants.121 And perhaps 
even more tellingly, once diversity issues were flagged and the company began slowing down 
recruitment, it did not increase diversity by increasing recruitment among non-White populations, 
but rather by maintaining non-White recruitment at the same levels while drastically reducing 
recruitment of White participants and eventually bringing it close to a halt.122
Nevertheless, this strategy can scarcely be said to have worked. Consider the case of 
enrollment of Black or African American volunteers for the Moderna vaccine trial. In August, 
when concerns about diversity in COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials began being voiced more 
forcefully,123 the Moderna trial had enrolled only 7% Black or African American volunteers.124 By 
mid-September that number had gone up to 13%.125 Yet, as noted above, once enrollment was 
120 Adapted from MODERNA, Moderna Cove Study, supra note 109, at 5. 
121 Id., ib.
122 Id., ib.
123 See e.g. Johnson, supra note 100; Cohen, infra note 128. 
124 Broodman, Among People of Color Asked to Join Covid-19 Vaccine Trials, Worries About Inequities Run Deep, 
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completed the overall percentage of Black participants had dropped to 10%.126 This number – as 
well as the overall diversity numbers in COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials – are far from the ones 
cited by public health experts as needed to accomplish the intertwined goals of accurately 
reflecting the racial and ethnic make-up of the United States and generating more granular data for 
purposes of regulatory review and vaccine trust-building.127
The specific demographic burden of COVID-19 poses even more challenges from the 
perspective of minority representation in vaccine clinical trials. The director of the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Dr. Anthony Fauci, has noted that, given the 
disproportionately higher toll of COVID-19 on minorities, clinical trials for COVID-19 vaccines 
should enroll a significantly larger percentage of minority volunteers than other types of trials.128
Dr. Fauci suggested that, in the specific case of COVID-19 vaccines, minority enrollment should 
in fact be twice as high as the percentage of minorities in the United States population,129 which 
commentators relying on the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data calculated to translate into a 
goal of 66.4% minority enrollment in COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials.130 While it is important 
that the representativity goals articulated by Dr. Fauci are far higher than the standards typically 
used in vaccine clinical trials – and in no way required by the FDA in assessing vaccine clinical 
trial data – the point remains that minority representation remains low as a feature of clinical trials 
in general, and vaccine clinical trials in particular. Dr. Fauci’s approach is also not an isolated one, 
with other members of the scientific community agreeing that, given both the historical under-
representation of minority populations in clinical trials and the burden of COVID-19 on minorities, 
it is necessary to oversample minority populations in vaccine trials.131
The Government Accountability Office, a non-partisan government United States 
agency,132 issued a report in November 2020 finding that, albeit successful in generating data on 
126 See Moderna Cove Study, supra note 112  (providing data on 25,654 out of 30,000 trial participants, which 
represents 85.5% of total enrollment). 
127 See e.g. Elizabeth Cohen, Despite Effort, Enrollment of Minorities for Coronavirus Vaccine Trial is Lagging, 




131 Johnson, supra note 100. 
132 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF, https://www.gao.gov/about/ 
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vaccine candidates in record time, the COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials lacked transparency.133 In 
particular, the report noted that the sponsors of the clinical trials provided little information on the 
collection and analysis of safety and efficacy data for population sub-groups, including racial and 
ethnic minorities: 
[COVID-19 vaccine] clinical trial protocols provide limited details 
on how the vaccine developers will analyze their safety and 
efficacy data, specifically for population subgroups (e.g., the 
elderly, people with comorbidities, or racial/ethnic groups) or 
sample sizes needed for such subgroup analyses. Unless vaccine 
developers collect sufficient data for a subgroup analysis, it may 
not be possible to identify the potential for different safety or 
efficacy results for one or more subgroups, even if vaccine 
candidates are found safe and effective in the aggregate for the 
general population.134
This chronic under-representation of minority populations in vaccine clinical trials feeds 
into larger vaccine trust problems, explored in Part II.B, which contribute towards vaccine 
hesitancy, leading individuals indicated for a vaccine to forego vaccination, sometimes even in 
cases in which the vaccine can be administered at no direct cost to the patient.135 But it is important 
to note here that disparities in racial and ethnic representation in data collection and generation 
during vaccine clinical trials are then compounded by other types of systemic disparities that 
pervade the vaccine development and distribution ecosystem. 
The mistrust experienced by minorities with regard to medical research and the ways in 
which clinical trials have been conducted for decades vastly exceeds the domain of COVID-19 
vaccines. A study following the administration of H1N1 vaccines in Los Angeles County at free 
vaccination clinics during the 2009 swine flu pandemic found “[w]ide racial/ethnic disparities in 
vaccination rates,” especially among Black populations.136 Outside the context of pandemic 
133 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-207, Federal Efforts Accelerate Vaccine and Therapeutic 
Development, but More Transparency Needed on Emergency Use Authorizations (Nov. 17, 2020) [hereinafter GAO 
Report]. 
134 Id., at 17. 
135 See e.g. Rueben C. Warren et al., Trustworthiness before Trust — Covid-19 Vaccine Trials and the Black 
Community, 383 N. ENGL. J. MED e121 (2020); William Wan, Coronavirus Vaccines Face Trust Gap in Black and 
Latino Communities, Study Finds, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/11/23/covid-vaccine-hesitancy/;  
136 Alonzo Plough et al., Pandemics and Health Equity: Lessons Learned from the H1N1 Response in Los Angeles 
County, 17 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 20 (2011), 
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vaccines, data gleaned over the years from seasonal flu vaccination provide a useful glimpse into 
disparities at the vaccine distribution and access levels.137 Vaccination rates among adult 
populations have historically been lower among Black, Hispanic, and American Indian or Alaska 
Native populations than among White populations.138 The lower rates are attributable to multiple 
factors, including lower insurance rates and logistical hurdles.139 However, trust deficits in the 
healthcare system and in medical research leading to the commercialization of new vaccines – and, 
more broadly, pharmaceutical products in general – remain a contributing factor of lower vaccine 
uptake among minority communities.140
Mistrust in the process leading to the commercialization of COVID-19 vaccines – both in 
the clinical trials and in FDA review of clinical trial data, as explained in Part II.B –  led to the 
announcement that several entities which do not play a role in drug regulation in the United States 
were forming task forces or panels to perform ad hoc reviews of any COVID-19 vaccines 
authorized or approved by the FDA.141
Responding to concerns about both minority under-representation and FDA review of 
COVID-19 vaccines, the National Medical Association (NMA) announced the creation of a task 
force composed of Black doctors to review COVID-19 vaccines and drugs.142 The National 
Medical Association is a professional and scientific organization founded in 1895 to respond to 
problems posed by Jim Crow laws and other mechanisms of racial segregation leading to the 
disenfranchisement of Black Americans.143 It began “representing African American physicians 
and health professionals in the United States” at a time in which the membership in the American 
https://journals.lww.com/jphmp/Abstract/2011/01000/Pandemics_and_Health_Equity___Lessons_Learned_From.4.
aspx 
137 See e.g. Samantha Artiga et al., Racial Disparities in Flu Vaccination: Implications for COVID-19 Vaccination 
Efforts, KFF (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/racial-disparities-flu-vaccination-implications-
covid-19-vaccination-efforts/ 
138 See CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Flu Vaccination Coverage, United States, 2019–20 Influenza 
Season (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage-1920estimates.htm (providing vaccination data on the 
most recent influenza season). 
139 Artiga et al, supra note 137. 
140 Id., ib. See also Washington, Medical Apartheid, supra note 58; Brandt, Racism and Research, supra note 58. 
141 See Eric Broodman, Not Trusting the FDA, Black Doctorsʼ Group Creates Panel to Vet Covid-19 Vaccines, STAT
(Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/09/21/black-doctors-group-creates-panel-to-vet-covid19-vaccines/ 
142 NAT’L MED. ASS’N, NMA FORMS COVID-19 TASK FORCE TO TAKE THE POLITICS OUT OF VACCINE 
DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 21, 2020) [hereinafter NMA Announcement], https://www.nmanet.org/news/527978/NMA-
Forms-COVID-19-Task-Force-Take-the-Politics-Out-of-Vaccine-Development.htm 
143 NAT’L MED. ASS’N, ABOUT US, https://www.nmanet.org/page/About_Us 
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Medical Association was denied to non-White physicians,144 and today it has over 30,000 
members.145 In August 2020, the NMA approved a resolution to create a COVID-19 taskforce, 
which included doctors affiliated with federal public health institutions at the core of the response 
to COVID-19, like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the vaccine advisory 
group responsible for federal vaccination recommendations (the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices, or ACIP), as well as representatives of medical professional 
organizations, such as the Infectious Disease Society of America and the  Pediatric Infectious 
Disease Society.146 The task force was charged with helping “address questions and concerns about 
efficacy, safety, and allocation of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics.”147 The NMA specifically 
framed the formation of the task force as prompted by concerns that diminishing “public trust in 
the FDA that will adversely affect participation in clinical trials, especially in the African-
American community.”148
The NMA’s taskforce was not the only case in which players normally extraneous to the 
FDA’s drug and vaccine review process announced interventions designed to act as a check on 
FDA review of COVID-19 clinical trial data. In late September 2020, citing politicization of the 
review of COVID-19 vaccine clinical trial data, the governor of New York announced that the 
state would independently review any COVID-19 vaccines approved by the FDA before allowing 
them to be distributed across the state.149 In October 2020, the governor of California announced 
the formation of the California COVID-19 Scientific Safety Review Workgroup, formed by 
“California physician scientists” to “independently review the safety and efficacy of any vaccine 
that receives FDA approval for distribution.”150 And in October 2020, the states of Washington, 
144 Id., HISTORY, https://www.nmanet.org/page/History 
145 Id., ABOUT US, supra note 143. 
146 NMA Announcement, supra note 142. 
147 Id., ib. 
148 Id., ib.
149 Michael Gold & Jesse McKinkley, New York Will Review Virus Vaccines, Citing Politicization of Process, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/nyregion/new-york-coronavirus-vaccine.html 
150 See CA. DPT. PUB. HEALTH, Scientific Safety Review Workgroup, 
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Scientific-Safety-Review-Workgroup.aspx.; CAL.
OFF. GOV., Governor Newsom Names Scientific Safety Review Workgroup to Advise State on COVID-19 Vaccines
(Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/10/19/governor-newsom-names-scientific-safety-review-workgroup-
to-advise-state-on-covid-19-vaccines/ 
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Oregon and Nevada joined California’s Review Workgroup.151 Although the Review Workgroup 
eventually endorsed the COVID-19 vaccine sponsored by Pfizer/BioNTech to which the FDA 
granted the first vaccine emergency use authorization,152  the formation of multiple state-level 
bodies charged with reviewing FDA vaccine authorizations speaks to the overall trust deficit 
currently experienced in the United States in connection with vaccine clinical trials – at least within 
the context of accelerated data production and regulatory review of vaccines as a major public 
health crisis unfolds. 
It is possible, indeed probable, that some of the factors that contributed to distrust of 
emerging COVID-19 vaccines are specific to the ways in which the federal response to the 
pandemic preparedness and response was perceived as defective by the general public and 
abundantly criticized by public health experts.153 As such, some of the events that colored public 
perceptions of COVID-19 vaccines are likely to remain idiosyncratic to the current pandemic. Yet, 
vaccine trust deficits have long been partly rooted in public perceptions of how vaccine clinical 
trial data is generated and assessed. In addition to affecting the scientific and regulatory processes, 
longstanding holes in the vaccine data infrastructure resulting from under-collection of information 
relative to minority populations pose challenges to vaccine trust that have long characterized 
vaccine R&D and that – absent more forceful corrective interventions – will persist beyond the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  
B. DATA SHARING: ENABLING SCRUTINY AND FOLLOW-ON INNOVATION
Even if imperfectly collected, data generated during vaccine clinical trials provides 
valuable clues not only to regulatory entities exercising their gatekeeping functions, but also to the 
151 CAL. OFF. GOV., Western States Join California’s Scientific Safety Review Workgroup to Ensure Safety of 
COVID-19 Vaccine (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/10/27/western-states-join-californias-scientific-
safety-review-workgroup-to-ensure-safety-of-covid-19-vaccine/   
152 CAL. OFF. GOV., Summary of Findings (Dec. 12, 2020), 
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/CDPH%20Document%20Library/COVID-19/Scientific-Safety-
Review-Workgroup-Recommendations-December-2020.pdf 
153 See e.g. Drew Altman, Understanding the US Failure on Coronavirus, 370 BRIT. MED J. m3417 (2020), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m3417; Eric C. Schneider, Failing the Test — The Tragic Data Gap 
Undermining the U.S. Pandemic Response, 383 N. ENGL. J. MED. 299 (2020), 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmp2014836 
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scientific community and, ultimately, the public at large.154 However, not all data collected during 
vaccine clinical trials can be scrutinized or used for follow-on research endeavors. On the one 
hand, there has long been evidence of significant under-reporting of data gathered during vaccine 
clinical trials.155 On the other, data that is disclosed in a specific context may be treated as secret 
or proprietary vis-à-vis third parties – the most common scenario involving clinical trial data 
disclosed to a regulatory agency in connection with an application to market a new vaccine.156
Together, these two types of restrictions have combined to erect significant hurdles to the free flow 
of data and scientific knowledge about newly developed vaccines. 
As far as the reporting and publication of vaccine clinical trial data is concerned, law and 
practice have long been poorly aligned. As seen above, the Declaration of Helsinki established that 
medical researchers had a duty to make the results of studies involving human subjects publicly 
available.157 Yet, studies have repeatedly found that the results of vaccine clinical trials are 
routinely published after a considerable delay, and in many cases are not published at all.158 These 
two phenomena have been documented in both the case of vaccines developed when a pandemic 
compresses vaccine development and testing timelines and outside the context of pandemics or 
other highly disruptive public health crises.159
The case of vaccine clinical trial data generated during the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic 
is instructive. These vaccines developed in a timeline that was even more compressed than the 
154 See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
155 See infra notes 160-171 and accompanying text. 
156 See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
157 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 71. 
158 See Lamberto Manzoli et al., Non-Publication and Delayed Publication of Randomized Trials on Vaccines: 
Survey, 348 BRIT. MED. J. 3058 (2014), https://www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g3058 (reporting publication delays 
and lack of publication of clinical trial data for vaccines developed both during and outside the context of a 
pandemic; Christopher W. Jones & Timothy F. Platts-Mills, Delayed Publication of Vaccine Trials, 348 BRIT. MED.
J. 3259 (2014), https://www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g3259 (similarly addressing both contexts); John P. A. 
Ioannidis et al., Publication Delay of Randomized Trials on 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) Vaccination, 6 PLOS ONE
e28346 (2011), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0028346 (presenting a case study 
focused solely on data from trials for H1N1 vaccines, which took place in response to the 2009 swine flu pandemic). 
Studies have also found that not all clinical trials are registered. See e.g. Scott M. Lassman, Clinical Trial 
Transparency: A Reassessment of Industry Compliance with Clinical Trial Registration And Reporting 
Requirements in the United States, 7 BRIT. MED. J. OPEN e015110 (2017), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5623439/; Jennifer Miller et al., Sharing of Clinical Trial Data and 
Results Reporting Practices Among Large Pharmaceutical Companies: Cross Sectional Descriptive Study and Pilot 
of a Tool to Improve Company Practices, 366 BRIT. MED. J. l4217 (2019), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l4217 
159 See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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timeline for the first COVID-19 vaccines: the strain of influenza that caused the 2009 pandemic 
was identified in April and the FDA approved four H1N1 vaccines in September of the same 
year.160 Yet publication of clinical trial data lagged considerably: of the 73 vaccine trials that took 
place between 2009 and 2010, only 21 had published data by June 2011, almost two years after 
FDA approval of the vaccines.161 This represents less than a third (29%) of the trial universe for 
vaccine candidates developed and tested in a situation of heightened public health need.162 The 
results of most H1N1 vaccine clinical trials remained unpublished.163
The same is true outside the context of pandemics.164 A study conducted by Lamberto 
Manzoli and colleagues surveyed 384 randomized vaccine clinical trials enrolling over 404,758 
participants.165 In addition to surveying H1N1 vaccine clinical trials, this study also included 
vaccines developed and tested outside pandemic contexts: human papillomavirus, meningococcal, 
pneumococcal, and rotavirus vaccines.166 The study found that, on average, only half of vaccine 
clinical trials were published after a median of 26 months from completion of the trial.167
Publication was defined as cases in which “one or more of the main outcomes appeared in a peer 
reviewed journal, either online or in print.”168 Almost two-thirds of the data relative to participants 
in randomized vaccine clinical trials was not published in peer-reviewed literature.169
160 See Jones & Platts-Mills, Delayed Publication of Vaccine Trials, supra note 158; Robert Roos, FDA Approves 
Four Companies’ H1N1 Vaccines, CIDRAP (Sept. 15, 2009), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-
perspective/2009/09/fda-approves-four-companies-h1n1-vaccines 
161 Ioannidis., Publication Delay of Randomized Trials on 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) Vaccination, supra note 158; 
Manzoli, supra note 165. 
162 Ionnidis, ib.
163 Id., ib. 
164 Manzoli, supra note 158. 
165 Id., ib.
166 Id., ib. 
167 Id., ib. 
168 Id., ib. 
169 Id., ib. Some of the trials not published in peer-review publications shared results through the national registry of 
clinical trials, ClinicalTrials.gov. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. The combined percentage of vaccine 
clinical trials publishing in peer-review and ClinicalTrials.gov was 61%. Id., ib. Studies in non-vaccine domains 
have similarly found that a significant percentage of clinical trials remains unpublished. See e.g. Joseph S. Ross, 
Publication of NIH Funded Trials Registered in Clinicaltrials.Gov: Cross Sectional Analysis, 344 BRIT. MED. J. 
7292 (2012) (finding that a third of registered NIH-funded trials are still unpublished after a median of 51 months 
following trial completion). 
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Delayed publication and lack of publication of vaccine clinical trial data produces 
detrimental effects that extend beyond the context of follow-on research.170As Kay Dickersin and 
Drummond Rennie noted in a 2003 study evaluating the implementation of the clinical trial 
registration requirements introduced by the 1997 Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
Act: “if the knowledge gained [through clinical trials] is never reported, the trust between patients 
and investigators and that between patients and research ethics review boards are both 
damaged.”171
In addition to these problems, segments of the vaccine data infrastructure often remain 
inaccessible to many players in the vaccine innovation ecosystem – from researcher to follow-on 
innovators in biopharma to activists in the health space – for relatively long periods of time. These 
cases encompass situations in which data collected during vaccine clinical trials has been reported 
and submitted for independent review, but is not made available outside the regulatory context.172
Sponsors of drugs and vaccines are required to submit data to regulatory agencies across 
the world in standardized ways in the form of clinical study reports (CSR).173  These reports tend 
to contain more data than what is disclosed through other channels, such as publication in peer-
review literature.174 However, not all the information contained in the clinical study reports 
submitted by drug and vaccine sponsors to regulatory entities is made publicly available.175 As 
further detailed in Part III, the European drug regulator has in recent years taken steps to promote 
170 See e.g. Trudo Lemmens & Candice Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to Health: The Human Rights 
Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 63 (2012) (making the case for greater clinical trial data 
registration and reporting from a human rights perspective). 
171 Kay Dickersin & Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 516 (2003), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12876095/  
172 See infra notes 178-183 and accompanying text. 
173 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., E3 Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports (1996), 
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/e3-structure-and-content-clinical-
study-reports; 61 Fed. Reg. 37,320 (July 17, 1996) (providing context on FDA guidance on clinical study reports 
issued in accordance with the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use). See also Beate Wieseler et al., Impact of Document Type on 
Reporting Quality of Clinical Drug Trials: A Comparison of Registry Reports, Clinical Study Reports, and Journal 
Publications, 344 BRIT. MED. J. D8141 (2012), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22214759/; Tom Jefferson et al., 
When to Include Clinical Study Reports and Regulatory Documents in Systematic Reviews, 23 BRIT. MED. J. EVID.
BASED MED 210 (2018), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30309870/ 
174 Ho, Avoiding the TRIPS Trap, supra note 93, at 17. 
175 See e.g. Hilda Bastian, What the systematic review of HPV vaccine clinical study reports does, and does not, 
reveal: commentary on Jørgensen et al., 7 SYST. REV. 117 (2018), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32106882/ 
(exploring this problem in the context of vaccine clinical study reports). 
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the disclosure of both CSR data and information often not contained in clinical study reports, as is 
the case of individual patient data.176
In the United States, The FDA has long treated most of the data submitted by sponsors – 
including vaccine data – as proprietary or quasi-proprietary, either by virtue of existing legal 
frameworks regulating trade secrecy and other types of confidential information, as well as FDA’s 
expansive approach to the concept of protected data.177
Data submitted to the FDA that qualifies as a trade secret cannot be disclosed by the 
agency.178 The law defines a trade secret as “any commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or 
device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities 
and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort.”179 Disclosure 
of data protected as a trade secret by an officer or employee of the FDA is punishable by a fine 
and removal from office or employment, and may result in imprisonment for up to a year.180
The prohibition on disclosure extends to commercial and financial information deemed 
“privileged or confidential,” which the law defines as “valuable data or information which is used 
in one's business and is of a type customarily held in strict confidence or regarded as privileged 
and not disclosed to any member of the public by the person to whom it belongs.”181
Data generated during clinical trials has long been treated by the FDA as proprietary 
information, and specifically as a trade secret. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in § 
331(j) prevents the FDA from disclosing “any method or process” that qualifies as a trade secret.182
In regulations issued in the 1970s, the Agency determined that “safety and effectiveness data for 
new drugs (…) fall within the trade secrets exemption and thus are not available for public 
disclosure,” a position it has maintained ever since.183
176 Ho, Avoiding the TRIPS Trap, supra note 93, at 18. See also Anna L. Davis & James Dabney Miller, The 
European Medicines Agency and Publication of Clinical Study Reports: A Challenge for the US FDA, 317 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N. 905 (2017), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28241281/#affiliation-1 
177 But see Peter Doshi, FDA to Begin Releasing Clinical Study Reports in Pilot Programme, 360 BRIT. MED. J. 
k294, (2018), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29363507/. 
178 21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (c). 
179 21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (a). 
180 18 U.S.C. § 1905. 
181 21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (b)(c). 
182 21 U.S.C. § 331(j). 
183 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,633. See also 42 Fed. Reg. 3,094. 
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Several legal commentators, however, have disagreed with FDA’s interpretation of § 331(j) 
in the FDCA. Rebecca Eisenberg has made the case that “it is by no means obvious from the 
statutory language that ‘any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection’ 
includes data from clinical trials.”184 Christine Galbraith has noted that some of the defining 
characteristics of clinical trials make them a poor fit for trade secrecy frameworks: “A fundamental 
tenet of trade secret law is that protection exists only as long as the information is kept confidential. 
The very nature of a clinical trial is quite public in many respects, making maintenance of complete 
secrecy fairly difficult.”185 And Arti Rai has argued that the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 
1984 further eroded FDA’s policy stance on clinical trial data by setting up a pathway for the 
approval of generic drugs that allows for FDA disclosure of data to follow-on innovators or the 
public in general, as long as the period of regulatory exclusivities attached to the reference drug 
has expired.186
In addition to the ongoing debate about FDA’s interpretation of the legal status of data 
submitted by drug and vaccine sponsors seeking market authorization, the mere existence of a 
filing of an investigational new drug application (IND) for a biologic – the regulatory category 
vaccines belong to – cannot be disclosed or acknowledged by the FDA.187 And even in the cases 
of information disclosed by sponsors as part of a submission to clinical trial registries, that 
information is not standardized, effectively allowing companies to often provide vague 
information.188
While the FDA announced some changes in connection with the authorization and approval 
of COVID-19 drugs and vaccines,189 a report issued by the Government Accountability Office in 
184 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 
380 (2007) (also acknowledging that “the longstanding administrative practice would make it difficult to adopt a 
narrower reading of the provision at this point”) Id., ib. 
185 Christine Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 
MISS. L. J. 705, 753 (2009).  
186 Arti K. Rai, Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical Data Silos, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1645, 1656-57 (2017). See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(l)(1), (1)(E) (2012). 
187 21 C.F.R. § 601.50 (a). See also id. 601.50 (c) (carving out an exception for individuals who have experienced an 
adverse effect in connection with administration of the biologic covered by an investigational new drug application). 
188 See Debora Zarin et al., Issues in the Registration of Clinical Trials, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2112 (2007), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17507347/. See also Miller, supra note 158 (further describing transparency issues 
in the reporting of clinical trial data). 
189 See e.g. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COVID-19 Update: FDA’s Ongoing Commitment to Transparency for 
COVID-19 EUAs (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/covid-19-update-fdas-
ongoing-commitment-transparency-covid-19-euas 
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November 2020 found that, at least in the case of COVID-19 therapeutic products, FDA had not 
always been transparent in disclosing data supporting emergency authorizations for non-vaccine 
products, “because the agency has not uniformly disclosed information from its scientific review 
of the safety and effectiveness data at the time of each authorization.”190 Similarly, some problems 
related to timely disclosure of information or data were reported in connection with COVID-19 
vaccine clinical trials.191 For example, Pfizer – the first vaccine sponsor to receive an emergency 
use authorization in the United States – delayed the release of the amended vaccine clinical trial 
protocol.192 And another pharmaceutical company, AstraZeneca, was criticized for being too slow 
to share negative results from its COVID-19 vaccine candidate clinical trials.193
Recently, other jurisdictions have adopted measures designed to increase transparency and 
access to both clinical trial data and other types of information relative to new drugs and 
vaccines.194 The Essay now surveys an example of a data policy adopted during the COVID-19 
pandemic by one of these jurisdictions as a blueprint for implementing measures that help mitigate 
some of the problems – albeit only on the data disclosure side – of the vaccine data infrastructure.   
III. TOWARDS A RICHER VACCINE CLINICAL TRIAL DATA INFRASTRUCTURE
So far, the Essay has highlighted some of the most salient and longstanding problems 
affecting the vaccine clinical trial data infrastructure. It has also surveyed some of the legislative 
efforts adopted from the mid-twentieth century onwards to improve the ways in which vaccine 
clinical trial data is both collected and shared. The shortcomings of current frameworks, however, 
indicate that further action continues to be necessary on these two fronts. 
190 GAO Report, supra note 133, at 20. 
191 See Jennifer E. Miller et al., Far More Transparency is Needed for Covid-19 Vaccine Trials, STAT (Nov. 5, 
2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/05/transparency-is-needed-for-covid-19-vaccine-trials/ 
192 Id., ib.
193 Id., ib. 
194 See e.g. Cynthia M. Ho, Avoiding the TRIPS Trap, supra note 93, at 5. See also EUR. MED. AGENCY, European 
Medicines Agency Policy on Publication of Clinical Data for Medicinal Products for human Use, Policy 70, 
EMA/144064/2019 (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/other/european-medicines-agency-
policy-publication-clinical-data-medicinal-products-human-use_en.pdf; Health Canada, Public Release of Clinical 
Data- Guidance Document (Mar.12, 2019), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drug-health-product-
review-approval/profile-public-release-clinical-information-guidance/document.html 
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Many of the interventions required to address the systemic problems explored throughout 
the Essay will necessarily have to occur on prolonged timelines, and require concerted efforts from 
different players in the vaccine development and deployment ecosystem. For example, addressing 
overall under-representation issues in vaccine clinical trials implies tackling intertwined yet 
fundamentally different problems, from logistical hurdles ranging from transportation and 
childcare arrangements, to existing implicit biases against racial and ethnic minority patients held 
by a majority of healthcare providers,195 just to name a few areas. Moreover, efforts to improve 
representation of racial and ethnic minorities in vaccine clinical trials cannot be detached from 
efforts needed in connection with under-representation of minorities in clinical trials involving 
other medical products. 
But while improving vaccine clinical trial data collection and sharing remains a long-term, 
multi-prong proposition, there are some more immediate fixes available to regulators and 
policymakers that would progressively enrich the vaccine clinical data infrastructure. As the 
COVID-19 pandemic exposed some of the holes in this infrastructure, it also provided the impetus 
for institutional players like the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the FDA to respond to 
ongoing vaccine data-related problems, particularly with regard to the disclosure of clinical trial 
data. 
Following years of criticism for lack of transparency of its clinical trial data sharing 
policy,196 the EMA started publishing clinical trial data submitted by drug and vaccine sponsors in 
2016 as part of an effort to render the regulatory review process more transparent.197 The amount 
of information made publicly available by the Agency according to this new policy vastly 
surpassed its previous practices, as well as the standard at the FDA.198 For each drug or vaccine 
application, the new policy mandated the disclosure of the clinical overview of the product, the 
195 See e.g. William J. Hall et al., Implicit Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals and Its Influence on 
Health Care Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 105 Am. J. Pub. Health e60 (2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4638275/ (finding that “[m]ost health care providers appear to have 
implicit bias in terms of positive attitudes toward Whites and negative attitudes toward people of color”). 
196 See e.g. Tracy Hampton, European Drug Agency Under Fire: Critics Charge That Trial Data Are Too 
Inaccessible, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 593, (2011), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21828315/ 
197 See EUR. MED. AGENCY, Clinical Data Publication, https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory/marketing-
authorisation/clinical-data-publication. See also ID., External Guidance on the Implementation of the European 
Medicines Agency Policy on the Publication of Clinical Data for Medicinal Products for Human Use (2018), 
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory/marketing-authorisation/clinical-data-publication. 
198 See Davis & Miller, supra note 176. 
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clinical summary, study reports associated with individual clinical studies, the study protocol, the 
sample case report form used to record information on an individual patient, and information on 
the statistical methods employed to evaluate the data collected during clinical trials.199
Nevertheless, the EMA suspended this new data disclosure policy in December 2018, 
shortly before relocating from London to Amsterdam in the wake of the Brexit vote.200 While the 
Agency committed to reinstating the policy after the move was completed, it announced a delay 
in 2020 citing the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic as the cause.201 As of January 2021 the policy 
remains suspended.202 However, during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic there were 
repeated calls for the Agency to share more information about clinical trial data submitted in 
connection with applications for COVID-19 drugs and vaccines.203 In response, in May 2020 the 
EMA announced the adoption of an ad hoc data policy for COVID-19 products, including 
vaccines.204 The ad hoc policy not only restored the publication of clinical trial data for approved 
COVID-19 products, but also the expedited and increased disclosure of other types of information 
about experimental and approved COVID-19 products.205 For example, the additional information 
now made available for COVID-19 products includes the expedited publication of product 
199 EUR. MED. AGENCY, Clinical Data Publication, supra note 197. See also EUR. MED. AGENCY, Common 
Technical Document for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use: Organisation Of Common Technical 
Document (2004), https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/scientific-guideline/ich-m-4-common-technical-
document-registration-pharmaceuticals-human-use-organisation-ctd-step-5_en.pdf (describing the content of each 
one of these types of documents). 
200 EUR. MED. AGENCY, Clinical Data Publication, supra note 197. See also ID., Relocation to Amsterdam, 
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/about-us/history-ema/relocation-amsterdam. See also Zachary Brennan, Brexit 
Impact: EMA Suspends Publication of Clinical Trial Data, RAPS (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-
articles/news-articles/2018/8/brexit-impact-ema-suspends-publication-of-clinica 
201 EUR. MED. AGENCY, Clinical Data Publication, supra note 197 (noting that, as of January 2021, the clinical trial 
data sharing policy “remains suspended due to ongoing business continuity linked to the COVID-19 pandemic”). 
202 Id., ib.
203 See e.g. IQWIG, Open Letter to the European Medicines Agency (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.iqwig.de/en/press/press-releases/all-clinical-trial-data-on-covid-19-medicines-and-vaccines-should-be-
published-on-the-day-of-marketing-authorisation.13015.html (providing the letter submitted to the EMA by the 
Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Healthcare, an independent drug and medical device review organization 
created in Germany in 2004). See IQWIG, Legal foundations of IQWiG, https://www.iqwig.de/en/about-
us/responsibilities-and-objectives-of-iqwig/legal-foundations-of-iqwig.2952.html 
204 See EUR. MED. AGENCY, European Medicines Agency Response to IQWiG on Transparency of COVID-19 
Related Activities, https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/other/european-medicines-agency-response-iqwig-
transparency-covid-19-related-activities_en.pdf 
205 ID., Transparency: Exceptional Measures for COVID-19 Medicines, https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-
regulatory/overview/public-health-threats/coronavirus-disease-covid-19/treatments-vaccines/transparency-
exceptional-measures-covid-19-medicines  
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3760919
Early draft. Forthcoming in Utah Law Review. Please direct comments to ana.rutschman@slu.edu 
33
applications and assessment reports, as well as the disclosure of information that the EMA does 
not typically share under its standard policy, such as the publication of the full body of the risk 
management plan for a given product instead of the publication of only the summary of the plan, 
as was usual under its standard data policy.206 In the specific case of vaccines, the EMA began 
publishing monthly safety updates for approved COVID-19 vaccines, something it does not do 
with other types of vaccines under the standard data policy.207 Moreover, the Agency is also 
releasing additional safety information about vaccines on an ad hoc basis.208
The following chart summarizes some of the main changes between the standard policy 
and the COVID-19 ad hoc policy adopted by the EMA. 
Standard Policy Policy for COVID-19 Products
Scientific advice No information is published Publication of list of products that have 




Active substance and therapeutic 
area disclosed on monthly list209
Announcement of application published 
within one day  
Product 
information 
Published in all E.U. languages 
with the product assessment 
report210
English version published within one day 
of favorable opinion from Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use
Publication 
of European Public 
Assessment Report
(EPAR)
Not published until at least two 
weeks after marketing 
authorization is issued  
Published within three days of marketing 
authorization 
Updates to EPAR Updates published Updates expedited for “major” changes 
Risk Management 
Plan (RMP) 
Summary of RMP published Full body of RMP published  
Clinical trial data Publication suspended; set to 
resume after COVID-19 pandemic
Clinical trial data 
published after marketing authorization is 
issued. Additional trial data published if 




209 ID., Medicines Under Evaluation, https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/medicines-under-evaluation 
(providing the monthly list of medicines under evaluation by the EMA). 
210 ID., European Public Assessment Reports: Background and Context, 
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/what-we-publish-when/european-public-assessment-reports-background-
context 
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Information not published Announcement of application published 




Information not published Published monthly for approved COVID-
19 vaccines. Additional information 
provided on ad hoc basis 
Figure 2: EMA's Standard Data Policy Versus COVID-19 Data Policy211
The quick adoption of the COVID-19 ad hoc data policy by the EMA shows how regulators 
can be more responsive to informational and transparency deficits in the vaccine data infrastructure 
– and to similar deficits affecting other types of medical products. This responsiveness is especially 
critical in the case of emerging vaccines. As seen in Part I.B, one of the most significant features 
of the COVID-19 vaccine race is that, unlike R&D focused on other COVID-19 medical products, 
it relies on a form of technology that, although studied for over a decade, is essentially new.212
Cutting-edge science, follow-on improvements and perceptions of medical products resulting from 
these scientific processes are all predicated on a robust and transparent flow of information and 
data. Moving forward, the data policy adopted by the EMA for COVID-19 products can and should 
be regarded as a starting point towards the building of a richer and more transparent data 
infrastructure. 
To be sure, the steps taken by the EMA to increase data disclosure during the pandemic 
happened on the heels of a policy reversal that greatly decreased the amount of information 
available about drugs, vaccines and other medical products outside the COVID-19 space.213
Although this reversal is meant to be temporary, it also calls attention to the difficulties regulators 
face in broadening the disclosure of clinical trial data and other types of drug- and vaccine-related 
information. While EMA’s policy reversal appears to have been at least partly rooted in its 
adjustment to Brexit, there are hurdles that are more generalizable to drug regulators across the 
world. As Cynthia Ho has recently pointed out, efforts to increase data disclosure by national 
regulatory agencies often bring data-related debates into the realm of intellectual property 
211 Adapted from ID., Transparency: Exceptional Measures for COVID-19 Medicines, supra note 205 (Jan. 5, 2020 
version). 
212 Infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
213 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
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negotiations, which in turn fall back on trade law channels to resolve international disputes, thus 
complicating the political economy of this area.214
Finally, it is important to note that the solution surveyed here addresses only one subset of 
problems in the vaccine data infrastructure. On their own, efforts to improve disclosure 
frameworks leave data generation, collection and publication problems untouched. This Essay has 
highlighted a range of shortcomings in the vaccine data infrastructure as it relates to the production 
of data about new vaccines, and concludes by pointing towards an existing example of the 
implementation of measures that addresses one of these shortcomings. Amidst the pressures posed 
by the pandemic on the scientific and regulatory communities, the adoption of the COVID-19 data 
policy at the EMA shows a path forward. Many other improvements are still necessary in the area 
of data disclosure alone, beginning with the adoption of more permanent data policies in Europe 
and, hopefully, beyond. 
214 See Ho, supra note 93, at 2-3. 
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